INTRODUCTION
Today's vehicles have several dozen electronic control units (ECUs) that control almost everything, such as air conditioning, electric windows, the engine, and the brake system. Several of these ECUs allow downloading of updated program and data code via a boot loader. Such software might be a control unit firmware update for fixing bugs, for improving features, or for downloading data such as additional multimedia files. The first case is also called a software download or simply flashing (since flash memory is updated). The download might be performed over a diagnostic channel or another available communication channel such as Bluetooth and GSM. Once such vehicle communication channels are opened to the outside world for downloading software, their integrity must be ensured. An example of a malicious software download is the replacement of firmware by an unauthorized party, e.g., as done for chip tuning. The main security objective is as follows:
1. Only original software must be accepted by the vehicle: No manipulated or malicious software may be downloaded to the ECU. In particular, software must not be successfully downloaded to the ECU that alters the defined behavior of the vehicle. 2. Only authenticated parties may alter data, e.g., parameters, stored in the ECU.
Furthermore, the following is desired for an actual security design:
 The compromise of a single control unit does not affect the entire system, i.e., a successful attack does not scale.  The required computational performance on the control unit side shall be minimal.
DIGITAL SIGNATURES
The secure software flashing scheme we present is based on digital signatures. A digital signature provides the security objective of integrity and authenticity; data being digitally signed cannot be altered by a malicious third party without being detected by the receiver. Furthermore, the receiver can verify that the data was indeed signed by the claimed signer.
A digital signature is computed as shown in Figure 1 . There is a key pair consisting of a secret key SK and a public key PK. Only the signer has access to SK whereas PK can be publicly distributed. In our setting, SK is only known to the automotive manufacturer whereas PK is built into every ECU. Message x is first hashed to a short fixed length value y. Typically y is computed by applying a hash function of the SHA family, resulting in an output of 20 to 32 bytes. Finally, a digital signature is computed over y using the secret key SK. The signature can then be verified by using the public key PK.
CERTIFICATES
As described above, a public key is used in each ECU and firmware programs are signed using the corresponding secret key. It is possible to use a separate public/private key pair for each model year, each ECU type, etc. Furthermore, it is possible to use certificates. A certificate compares to a passport; it certifies a public key and, if required, an identity. In our case, the certificate is simply a public key signed by the OEM's secret key together with the public key and some additional information: Sig SK (PK A ) | PK A | data. The flash program is then signed by PK A. When the flashing process begins, the certificate first needs to be downloaded and verified using PK, and then the flash program is downloaded and verified using PK A .
SECURE SOFTWARE FLASHING
A solution for this problem in general is quite simple. Based on digital signatures, the issuer of the software signs the program code and the control unit in the vehicle verifies it. Hence, the issuer holds a secret key for signing the program code and the control units hold the corresponding public key for verifying it. This is shown in Figure 2 in more detail. First, the software is developed. Once it is finished (Step 1), the program object code is passed to a trust center ( Step 2) that signs the object code using its secret key. The signature is then passed back and attached to the program object code. The package of code and signature is now stored in a database (Step 4) that might hold versions for different control units. Finally, the appropriate program code is downloaded to a control unit ( Step 5) and verified by means of the public key stored in the ECU (Step 6).
One can see that security objective (1) On the server side the key management and the organizational security must be thoroughly organized. Organizational security includes the organization of who has access to sign program code and how the process of signing is performed and recorded. However, no fullsized Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) is necessary. Basically, it is sufficient to issue a single private/public key pair such that the private key is stored in the trust center and the public key in the control unit. The trust center might simply be a PC that is disconnected from any computer network and a secure smart card that holds the secret key. If a finer-grained approach is desired, a key pair for each control unit type, for each production year, or each production location might be applied. No certificates that induce overhead are required, though. The ECU only needs to store a public key such that no secret information is stored here. However, this public key must be protected against manipulation. Otherwise, an adversary could replace this key in the ECU and then activate any manipulated software.
Security objective (2) can be fulfilled by a simple challenge-and-response mechanism as shown in Figure  3 . The vehicle and an external party (e.g., a standard PC) share a secret key. The parties then run a challenge-response scheme in order to prove that the external party knows the secret key. After a successful run, the external party can access the vehicle's data to adjust parameters. However, it is crucial that a welldefined interface be specified. For instance, it is reasonable to record all changes in a log file and give access only to non-safety critical data. Using a symmetric-key management is reasonable -each ECU knows an individual symmetric secret key shared with the third party. This third party might be the car manufacturer storing all keys in a protected database. The security can be further increased by using security tokens that hold the secret key for accessing the ECU. Such an approach even allows several authorization levels to be implemented. For instance, there might be a basic level for workshops to adjust typical parameters, and another level for testing that allows all parameters to be changed.
Protecting the key built into the ECU is crucial. If an adversary is able to read out a symmetric key or replace a public key he might be able to manipulate program or data code. Thus, virtual software protection can be achieved only by applying hardware-assisted approaches employing a security anchor as described in [4] .
Nevertheless, there are also mechanisms that try to complicate utilization or at least try to help identify the origin in case software could be successfully read out by an attacker. In order to make decompiling and reengineering of program binaries more difficult, programs known as "obfuscators'' convert source code, object code, or both, into obfuscated code, making the result excessively complicated and thus far less readable and almost impossible to understand by a human being. However, obfuscation [3] only increases the difficulty for reverse engineering, limits portability and is regarded as "security through obscurity''. Digital watermarking [1] and fingerprinting are techniques which embed visible or invisible information into a digital content (software or data) that cannot be removed or modified or can only be removed or modified with difficulty. Original owners then can use tools to extract the embedded information to detect, e.g., the origin of an illegitimate copy or tampering. However, there are already technologies for both mechanisms to abolish respective restrictions. Thus, such mechanisms cannot replace proper hardware-based software protection.
SECURE FLASH PROCESS
The flash program file has several parts. Each block is optionally encrypted, and the signature of the file was computed beforehand. In the first step, the external device that triggers the flashing process optionally authenticates the bootloader (e.g., by a challengeresponse mechanism as described above). In the next step, a certificate might be passed to the bootloader which verifies it using its stored public key. Then, the external device passes block by block to the ECU's bootloader. The bootloader first decrypts the block and then stores it in the flash memory. At the same time, the bootloader incrementally computes the hash over each block. Once all blocks are passed, the bootloader finalizes the computation of the hash value over the new flash program file and performs a digital signature verification using the determined hash value. If the signature verification is successful, the downloaded file is accepted and activated. Otherwise, a safety procedure is activated and the bootloader awaits the download of a proper flash file. This is shown in Figure 4 . 
CONCLUSIONS
More and more vehicles' ECUs are equipped with flash memory. Usually, a bootloader is built into the firmware to update the program. However, in most cases there are no mechanisms implemented to avoid downloading a manipulated program that alters the device's behavior in a manner not authorized by the OEM. In this article we presented mechanisms to protect the software update process. Such a mechanism was already implemented in a variety of applications, ranging from the automotive domain to gambling and the mobile phone industry. The German OEMs even standardized the mechanism for a secure bootloader [2] . While this standard allows the use of symmetric cryptography only via a so-called message authentication code (MAC), we strongly suggest implementing the asymmetric cryptographic approach based on digital signatures; otherwise either our original security requirements cannot be fulfilled or the organizational effort is immense.
While the cryptographic mechanisms are generally straightforward to implement, security needs to be provided at all levels, ranging from organization security to appropriate mechanisms for signing the firmware up to inclusion of suppliers. In particular, the security mechanisms need to be carefully incorporated into the existing development processes.
